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Medicare Advantage Administrative and Marketing Payments: When Are They Kickbacks?

November 19, 2026

When Do Medicare Advantage Broker Payments Become Kickbacks?

More than two years ago, Oak Street Health agreed to pay $60 million to resolve allegations that it paid kickbacks to insurance agents to steer Medicare Advantage beneficiaries to its primary care clinics. As partner Erica Blachman Hitchings commented at the time, the settlement reflected a broadening of Medicare Part C enforcement. Alongside cases involving inflated diagnosis codes, federal authorities began using the Anti-Kickback Statute (“AKS”) to pursue payments intended to influence which plans Medicare Part C beneficiaries joined or which providers they chose.

In Oak Street, the alleged link between payment and referrals was direct: agents were paid for each eligible beneficiary they referred to clinics. The connection is arguably less direct when a Medicare Advantage plan pays a broker ostensibly for marketing or administrative services. A Medicare Advantage marketing fee can be a kickback if the plan uses it to pay a broker to steer enrollments, and internal emails and enrollment trackers can expose the true intent behind these payments. The ongoing Shea v. eHealth case illustrates how insiders can help the government if they suspect marketing or administrative payments are being used to steer Part C referrals.

How the Anti-Kickback Statute Applies to Medicare Advantage

Medicare Part C, commonly called Medicare Advantage, allows beneficiaries to receive their Medicare benefits through private insurers. Medicare then pays these plans a monthly sum for each enrolled beneficiary.  This per-beneficiary payment gives plans a financial incentive to attract and retain as many members as possible.

That incentive can conflict with the AKS. The AKS prohibits knowingly and willfully offering or paying anything of value to induce referrals for items or services payable by a federal healthcare program. It also prohibits knowingly and willfully soliciting or receiving such payments in return for that business.[i] A Medicare Advantage plan can qualify as an “item or service” under the AKS, so the statute applies to payments intended to induce brokers to steer MA beneficiaries toward a particular plan or provider.[ii]

What Can Medicare Advantage Plans Pay Brokers?

Enrollment Commissions and Finder’s Fee Caps

The easiest red flags to spot are payments to brokers that exceed allowable per-referral limits.

Medicare Advantage plans may pay independent agents and brokers commissions for enrolling beneficiaries and for subsequent renewals.  However, to ensure plans operate on a level playing field, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) caps these commissions.  Plans may only pay brokers up to a set maximum (for example, the default Medicare Advantage broker commission cap is $694 per beneficiary for an initial enrollment for contract year 2026).[iii]

Plans may also pay a broker a separate finder’s fee of up to $100 for referring a prospective enrollee.[iv] The referral can be via a “warm transfer” — connecting the beneficiary directly with an enrollment representative by phone or by scheduling an appointment for the beneficiary to discuss enrollment.

One example came in U.S. ex rel. Butler,  a case filed by a pair of WLC clients who alleged that a plan offered to pay their insurance agency $150 over the regulated commission rate per referral, a clear violation of the CMS cap.  The case generated two strong court opinions and serves as a lesson that the amount paid per referral can strongly indicate intent to induce.[v]

Marketing and Administrative Fees: The Fair Market Value Standard

In addition to the enrollment and finder’s fees, plans may pay brokers and field marketing organizations (FMOs), which coordinate and support networks of agents and brokers, for specific marketing and administrative work that supports enrollment efforts. That work can include producing television or social media ads, printing and mailing marketing materials, generating leads, and training agents.

Unlike commissions and finder’s fees, marketing and administrative payments have no fixed dollar cap. Plans may pay up to the market value of the services rather than reimburse brokers or FMOs dollar for dollar.[vi] That leaves room for a spread between what the work costs and what the plan pays.

Concerned by some abusive practices in the industry, in 2024, CMS issued a rule to prevent plans from disguising extra enrollment compensation as marketing or administrative fees, thereby sidestepping the commission cap. The rule folded marketing and administrative payments into the total enrollment compensation cap and raised the cap by $100. Brokers and industry groups quickly challenged the rule, and a federal court vacated the provision in Americans for Beneficiary Choice v. HHS.[vii] This ruling preserved the nebulous fair market value standard.

When Can Marketing and Administrative Fees Become Kickbacks?

Rather than rewarding individual referrals, marketing payments and administrative reimbursements fund broad operations up front, sometimes before any leads have been generated. From an enforcement standpoint, that distance from the referral makes it harder to connect a payment to an individual referral and prove that a plan paid with the intent to induce referrals, as the AKS requires. And because fair market value sets no fixed dollar ceiling, a plan can disguise extra enrollment compensation as a legitimate marketing expense.

Courts therefore look beyond the amount and the contract label and must engage in the fact-intensive inquiry into what the plan expected in return for a payment.

The most telling inquiry is what the plan bought: identifiable marketing and administrative work, the broker’s commitment to steer beneficiaries to its plans, or both?

Many courts apply the one-purpose test: a marketing or administrative payment can violate the AKS if only one of the plan’s purposes was to induce referrals, even if the broker also performed legitimate work.[viii]

For example, a plan pays for a television campaign, and the ads are aired. The plan then pays the FMO or broker a large “co-op” or marketing payment. If the parties worked backward from a promised enrollment target to set the price, or the plan sought to cut future payments when the broker fell short on enrollment numbers, those facts may help show that the plan was paying for enrollments, not just advertising. The fact that the advertising work was performed is not enough to cure the transaction of AKS liability.

Shea v. eHealth, Inc.

This was the case in United States ex rel. Shea v. eHealth, Inc., an ongoing FCA suit against Aetna and other Medicare Advantage insurers and brokers. Aetna’s contracts with a broker described payments as reimbursement for generating leads and making calls. But the United States alleged that when eHealth fell about 4,000 sales short of a 29,000-sales commitment, Aetna sought to count that shortfall against future marketing payments, even though the written contract did not mention the sales target.[ix].  The government alleged that this demonstrated the impermissible intent behind the payments.

In denying the Defendant’s motion to dismiss the kickback claims, Judge Casper cited the Butler broker kickback case originally brought by a WLC client.  Judge Casper explained that “the substance of the agreements and payments control, not their form.”[x] The contracts called the payments marketing fees, but the United States had plausibly alleged that the insurers paid for enrollments.

What Evidence Can Medicare Advantage Whistleblowers Bring Forward?

Given the need to prove intent, insiders are crucial in bringing AKS cases involving administrative and marketing payments.

The court’s decision to allow the United States’ FCA claims to proceed in Shea was highly fact-dependent and relied heavily on private messages and emails. For example, as detailed in the government’s complaint, one plan responded to an FMO’s proposal for a bonus tied to lead production saying: “it just all depends how we describe it [because] CMS has very strict rules on how we compensate partners.”  Or, more bluntly, an eHealth employee wrote: “if Aetna got audited by CMS, they’d be fu[]ed”.[xi]

While the facts alleged in Shea are compelling, the MTD shows that insiders do not need to approach the government with smoking-gun evidence.  The government often can uncover such key evidence if a whistleblower sets them on the right path.  In essence, a whistleblower can help to set an effective government investigation in motion by supplying plausible evidence of kickbacks.  For example, in his amended complaint, the relator in eHealth provided original knowledge of:

  • An Aetna spreadsheet that tracked eHealth’s progress toward 17,164 new enrollments tied to $1.4 million in marketing funds.
  • An internal email that linked $1.2 million in marketing funds to an expectation of more than 7,600 applications.
  • Some insurers paid eHealth substantially more for the same purported administrative services than they had in prior years, while other insurers continued to pay the same rate. [xii]

Contact Us

A whistleblower may see only one piece of an illegal enrollment arrangement. But sometimes that is all it takes.  An invoice, a sales tracker, or an email explaining how the parties set the fee can give government investigators a concrete starting point. If you believe you’ve uncovered a scheme that uses marketing or administrative payments to disguise kickbacks, contact us for a confidential consultation.

 

Endnotes:

[i] See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(1)–(2).

[ii] United States ex rel. Shea v. eHealth, Inc., No. 1:21-cv-11777, slip op. at 16–17 (D. Mass. Mar. 25, 2026).

[iii] See Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Contract Year 2026 Agent and Broker Compensation Rates, Referral/Finder’s Fees, Submissions, and Training and Testing Requirements (June 18, 2025)

[iv] 42 C.F.R. § 422.2274(f)

[v] See United States ex rel. Butler v. Shikara, 748 F. Supp. 3d 1277 (S.D. Fla. 2024).

[vi] 42 C.F.R. § 422.2274(e)(1)–(2) (2023).

[vii] Ams. for Beneficiary Choice v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 4:24-cv-00439, slip op. at 21–22 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 18, 2025).

[viii] United States v. Greber, 760 F.2d 68, 72 (3d Cir. 1985).

[ix] United States’ Complaint in Intervention ¶¶ 405–07, 413–16, Shea, ECF No. 41.

[x] Shea, Slip op. at 11.

[xi] United States’ Complaint in Intervention ¶¶ 385, Shea, ECF No. 41

[xii] Relator’s Amended Qui Tam Complaint ¶¶ 96, 101–02, ECF No. 40.